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Abstract 
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the North Caucasus is known as a politically unstable 
region and as a melting pot for terrorism and all kinds of criminal activity, reaching from drug-
trafficking and illegal arms trade to hijacking and extortion. Furthermore, the North Caucasus is 
one of Russia’s poorest and least developed regions. Although the role of Islam as a 
destabilizing factor should not be overestimated, it is a determining characteristic regarding the 
region’s past and current development. The paper considers specific influencing factors like the 
North Caucasus’ geographical location, foreign influence, its Soviet past, its history of 
Islamization, its societal structure, its ethnic heterogeneity and the prevalent Russian 
institutional vacuum with a focus on Islam and its local characteristics. Then it is questioned 
whether sustainable socio-economic development is possible within the prevalent institutional 
environment and whether Islam plays a decisive role or not. It is discovered, that weak 
governance on the central and regional levels and the inability to implement and enforce the 
rule of law are responsible for the region’s socio-economic situation. The form of societal 
organization plays a role, too. These factors, however, are historically determined and will 
therefore persist, in part even in the long run. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the North Caucasus is known as a politically unstable 
region and as a melting pot for terrorism and all kinds of criminal activity, reaching from drug-
trafficking and illegal arms trade to hijacking and extortion. For Russia, the North Caucasian 
federal subjects bear a danger that should not be underestimated. Terrorist attacks on Russian 
territory, for example the Moscow theatre hostage taking in 2002, the Moscow metro terror 
attack in 2004, the Beslan school siege in 2004, the terror attack on the Nevsky Express railway 
train in 2009, or the suicide bombings in the Moscow metro in 2010 caused several hundred of 
deaths. Furthermore, it is feared that separatist movements could encourage other parts of the 
population. And, the Russian state is not interested in loosing control over the resource-rich 
regions surrounding the Caspian Sea or securing access to these regions. Islamic radicalism 
definitely plays a role in the region’s current history, but also international crime in other areas. 
Hence, a political and socio-economic stabilization of the North Caucasus would imply a 
setback for international terrorism and illegal activities. However, until now, all Russian 
military and financial efforts were only partly successful if at all.  
Although the role of Islam as a destabilizing factor should not be overestimated, it is a 
determining factor regarding the North Caucasus’ past and current development. On the one 
hand it depicts a traditional and cultural component and on the other hand, for two decades, a 
radical movement. Since the 9/11-terrorist attacks in New York, Islam came into public and 
political focus in several ways. One question that is examined since then is whether Islam is 
generally inhibiting to economic growth and development.† A reason for this is possibly the 
idea that high living standards, that are usually accompanied by high education levels, increase 
political and social stability and decrease the “vulnerability” for radical ideas. 
Underdevelopment, low living standards and poor education, on the other hand, can be breeding 
grounds for political and social instability and extremist thoughts. Most countries with major 
Muslim populations do in fact not belong to the high-technology industrialized states. The 
exceptions, like the oil-rich Gulf States, exhibit some special characteristics which make them 
economically incomparable to their co-religionists. Most states with major Muslim parts of the 
population belong to the less-developed or even underdeveloped economies (Dobler, 2011).‡ 
                                               
†
 The question whether Islam inhibits economic development has been discussed for decades if not centuries, see for example 
Huff (2003), Kuran (2011), Landes (1998), Lewis (1970, 2002). However, public and academic interest grew significantly 
since 2001. 
‡
 The wealth of the Arabic states that belong to the group of high-income countries originates in their resource richness and in the 
relatively small indigenous population numbers. Hence, in per capita measures, the resource wealth is divided between 
relatively small populations. This results in high per capita income levels. Turkey is an example that exhibits high growth rates 
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Whether Islam is inhibiting for economic development or not is debated somewhere else.§ The 
current article wants to examine whether Islam is to blame for the socio-economic 
underdevelopment and the political instability of the North Caucasus. Dealing with Islam and 
its influence on economic, political and social stability is quite important for the Russian state. 
Not only because of the multifaceted impacts a radical Islamic North Caucasus could have, but 
also because the Russian Muslim population is growing significantly. Currently, more than 10 
percent of the Russian population are Muslims, that is between 15 and 20 million Russians. And 
the Muslim minority is growing, whereas the total Russian population decreases (Dannreuther 
& March, 2010; Gorenburg, 2006). Hence, the Islamic factor will play a role for Russia in the 
long run.  
However, trying to analyse whether Islam has an impact on the economy, polity or society one 
will always discover that Islam is not a homogenous entity that implements the same rules and 
influences societies in the same way all around the globe. On the contrary, Islam is much 
influenced by local and regional norms and customs and exhibits very different forms. The most 
well-known differentiation probably exists between Shia and Sunni Islam. However, even 
within these two directions, fundamental differences exist, for example in Sunni Islam regarding 
the four major Islamic legal schools, the Maliki, Hanifite, Shafi’ite and Hanbali. Furthermore, 
the fact that there is no central form of organisation, no “church”, offers the possibility for 
different interpretations and ways to realize Islamic belief. Hence, the socio-economic impact of 
Islam in general is difficult to examine, since its individual implementation differs too much 
between regions and even local clans and tribes. For example, Islamic law, the sharia, is often 
depicted as anti-modern and cruel, since apparently it incorporates punishments like stoning or 
hacking off limbs. However, the sharia is not an official rule-book incorporating all forms of 
Islamic punishment. Instead, the particular implementation depends on local norms and 
customs. The sharia has never been written down as a general wording of the law. It is a 
subordinate term for the different implementations of Islamic law, incorporating primarily 
family and inheritance law. That is to say, Islamic law depends on local traditions and norms 
and hence, it differs greatly between countries, regions and even clans and tribes.  
Therefore, the analysis of Islam in the North Caucasus concentrates on the prevalent forms of 
Muslim belief and not on Islam in general. It can be questioned whether the religion as it is 
practised in the region has an influence on the socio-economic conditions. Hence, we are rather 
                                                                                                                                                   
and positive trends regarding economic development. However, Turkey still shows large differences in income and regional 
development patterns. The same is true for some Asiatic countries with Muslim majorities. At any rate, there are countries 
with Muslim majorities that realize high levels of economic development. But they are outnumbered. 
§
 See, for example, the works of Landes (1998), Lewis (1970, 2002), Kuran (2004, 2008, 2011). 
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talking about local practices than Islam in general. Another question that will be analysed is 
whether the emergence of radical or violent Islam has an impact on the region’s development. 
At any rate, both, local forms of Islam and radical Islam, are not equated with Islam in general. 
Instead, a certain region and its specific characteristics and influencing components are 
observed. Furthermore, the prevalent religious beliefs cannot be considered in isolation. Hence, 
many influencing factors exist and must be observed. 
Regarding the North Caucasus, specific influencing factors are its geographical location, the 
exertion of foreign influence, its Soviet past, its history of Islamization, its societal structure, its 
ethnic heterogeneity and the prevalent Russian institutional vacuum.  
The current article considers all relevant factors with a focus on Islam and its local 
characteristics. Then it is questioned, whether sustainable socio-economic development is 
possible within the prevalent environment. 
We will not try to establish a causal relationship between Islam and economic growth. That is, 
the article will not analyse certain Islamic rules that are supposed to harm economic 
development. But it will be demonstrated that the region’s development inhibits economic 
progress. The Islamic revival plays its role in this development.  
The North Caucasus is one of Russia’s poorest and least developed regions. The low level of 
economic development, the situation of instability and insecurity and the region’s connections 
to international crime and terrorism inhibit any progress. If we take a look at Russia’s real GDP 
per capita data between 1996 and 2007, we find the regions of the North Caucasus at the bottom 
end.** Hence, the North Caucasian regions exhibited low living standards in the mid-1990s and 
they do so today. Although real GDP per capita levels improved, the order is still the same, see 
tables 1 and 2. 
Analysing the reasons for the bad economic performance of the North Caucasus, it is impossible 
to prove a causal relationship between a certain cause and effect. Let alone the historical 
heritage of the Soviet Union is a unique prerequisite that has to be considered. But still, 
studying the region’s historical, political, societal and religious background, it becomes obvious 
why economic progress is so difficult and hits upon seemingly irresolvable problems that do not 
originate from the economic sphere. And the problems will not subordinate themselves to 
economic criteria, although those might lead to higher living standards for all members of the 
population.  
 
                                               
**
 The Russian regions of the Caucasus are Adygea, Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia 
and North-Ossetia-Alania. The seven North Caucasian regions belong to the poorest Russian federal subjects, whereas Russia 
is currently divided into 83 subjects. 
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Mari El republic 1996 5862.10 
Altay republic 1996 5678.93 
Karachay-Cherkessia republic 1996 5415.65 
Kabardino-Balkaria republic 1996 5386.62 
Adygeya republic 1996 5111.73 
Tuva republic 1996 4623.91 
Northern Osetia-Alania republic 1996 4614.51 
Kalmykia republic 1996 3954.52 
Dagestan republic 1996 2728.97 
Ingushetia republic 1996 2620.80 
Chechnya republic 1996 2620.80 
Table 1: real GDP per capita 1996 (roubles), 11 federal subjects with 
the lowest real GDP per capita values in 1996 (own calculation). Data: 
Goskomstat. 
 
Northern Osetia-Alania republic 2007 69976.13 
Altay republic 2007 67694.06 
Ivanovo oblast 2007 65203.88 
Karachay-Cherkessia republic 2007 61542.11 
Adygeya republic 2007 60241.14 
Dagestan republic 2007 58065.73 
Tuva republic 2007 57789.24 
Kalmykia republic 2007 54163.30 
Kabardino-Balkaria republic 2007 51895.29 
Chechnya republic 2007 36495.85 
Ingushetia republic 2007 26852.30 
Table 2: real GDP per capita 2007 (roubles). 11 federal subjects with 
the lowest real GDP per capita values in 2007 (own calculation). Data: 
Goskomstat. 
 
2. Geopolitical location and foreign influence 
 
In many respects the Caucasus (North and South) depicts one entity and it does not make sense 
to divide it into multiple sub-regions. Furthermore, its territorial definition differs depending on 
whether we take a geographical or a political look on it. Still, it is usually differentiated between 
the North and the South Caucasus. The border is depicted by the highest mountain range and the 
watershed (Coene, 2010). Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are defined as South Caucasus. The 
Northern part lies on Russian territory. However, the current article concentrates on the North 
Caucasus. This is the case since Russia and its handling with Islam in the Russian Caucasian 
regions are considered. The inclusion of the independent republics of the South Caucasus would 
have exceeded the scope of the work. However, the author is aware of the fact that the Caucasus 
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is not restricted to its Northern part and that the region’s South plays an important role 
regarding current political and socio-economic developments.  
The North Caucasus can be differentiated into the North-West and the North-East Caucasus, the 
former including Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia and North Ossetia and the 
latter consisting of Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia. The North-West and the North-East 
Caucasus exhibited different historical experiences, especially regarding the way and impact of 
Islamization.  
The North Caucasus is one of the ethnically most diversified regions in the world. More than 
100 different ethnic groups live in the whole Caucasus, many of which exhibit their own forms 
of societal and political organization, individual languages and local norms and customs 
(Coene, 2010; Kurbanov, 2009). The societal structures correspond to a hierarchic form of 
organization emphasising collectivism and being shaped by customary norms and traditions. 
Clan and family ties are far more important for the functioning of the society than central state 
structures. Furthermore, the incorporation of the North Caucasus into the Russian Federation 
makes the region prone to central Russian interference.  
 
 
Figure 1: ethnic groups. Source: Nichols, 2010, p. 2. 
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The North Caucasus has a direct border with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Behind these two 
countries lie Turkey, Armenia and Iran. Dagestan borders the Caspian Sea on whose north-
eastern side lies Central Asia with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan. Then come Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The North Caucasus is embedded within 
a range of countries that are not particularly famous for their political stability, their rule of law 
and economic success (partly leaving beside Turkey). On the contrary, some of its direct and 
indirect neighbours can be described as ‘weak states’ or ‘failed states’. According to the Failed 
States Index 2011, Afghanistan and Pakistan are failed states, while Kyrgyzstan, Iran, 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan also exhibit high (which means bad) scores. A failed 
state is usually characterized by a weak government that lost its legitimacy and control, 
including control over parts of its territory and, for example, over the military. Furthermore, a 
failed state cannot provide public goods like a social security system or infrastructure anymore. 
Usually it is penetrated by corruption and crime, it cannot interact within the international 
community and exhibits economic decline. All of the states surrounding the North Caucasus, 
even Russia itself, feature at least some of these characteristics.  
The Caucasus and large parts of Central Asia consist of mountainous and partly inaccessible 
terrain what makes border control quite difficult. The whole region is economically 
underdeveloped and well-known for criminal and terrorist activities. During and after the first 
Chechen war, for example, it was not difficult for former fighters of the Russo-Afghan war to 
cross some borders and fight on the side of the Chechen rebels. The complex geographical 
location and the region’s political instability make it easily accessible for foreign influence. The 
Islamic revival that is observable since the end of the Soviet Union would have been impossible 
without financial support from foreign co-religionists. The funds came from organizations in 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, Pakistan and other countries. The money financed the Islamic 
building boom starting after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Mosques, madrasas, Islamic 
universities and educational organizations were built and endowed. A corresponding Islamic 
infrastructure was recreated and Islamic publication was financed and diffused. Islamic mullahs 
and imams were sent to the North Caucasus from the Arab and the wider Muslim world to 
educate young Caucasian Muslims in the sense of “pure” Islam. On the other hand, the 
Caucasian Muslims were sent to universities and educational institutions in the Arab world to 
receive an adequate Islamic education. With the foreign influence came radical Wahhabi Islam 
to the North Caucasus. Prior to the foreign involvement most Muslims in the region practised 
Sufi Islam, a form of Islam including pre-Islamic and superstitious elements. The foreign 
mullahs and teachers of Islam that were sent to the North Caucasus were alarmed when they 
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saw how Islam was practised in the region. Their task was to bring back pure Islam and teach 
the people accordingly. In their opinion, the society should implement the pure teachings of the 
prophet and therefore, Muslims had to obey to the Quran and the sharia without any request. 
The only way to enforce their goals was to implement an Islamic state, a caliphate. Under the 
influence of the Wahhabis some villages and regions in the North Caucasus implemented sharia 
law. The majority of the population, however, rejected the new teachings. They further 
preferred their traditional form of Islam, Sufism, and the corresponding lifestyle. Therefore, the 
history of the North Caucasus after the collapse of the Soviet Union is characterized by often 
armed conflicts between Sufis and Wahhabis, pushing parts of the region at the margin of a civil 
war. The North Caucasus’ internal struggles between the traditionalists and the radicals turned 
efforts to gain independence into religious conflicts. These conflicts necessitated foreign 
ideological and financial support. According to Khanbabaev (2010, p. 103), between 1995 and 
1999, foreign Islamic organizations equipped Dagestani Islamic extremists with more than 10 
million US dollars.  
In the early 2000s, however, foreign Islamic funding has been substantially reduced by the 
official authorities. North Caucasian governments and influential politicians and leaders, but 
also the central government in Moscow, realized the danger emanating from the Wahhabi 
movement and reacted with the curtailment of foreign Islamic sponsoring, inter alia. Besides, 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan attracted the attention of the particular sponsors, which 
removed some of their financial assistance to support corresponding recipients in these 
countries. 
 
3. The history of Islamization 
 
The Soviet Union was home to 60 million Muslims. After the breakup in 1991, 15 million 
Muslims remained on the territory of the Russian Federation. Thereof seven millions are 
residents of the Volga-Urals region and five millions live in the North Caucasus. More than half 
of Tatarstan’s and Bashkortostan’s population are Muslims. In the North Caucasus, the same is 
true for Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia. In 
Adygea, 25 percent of the population are Muslims (Yemelianova, 2010, p. 122). 
Because of their Soviet history and temporary, but also geographical, separation from other 
world regions, the Russian Muslims differ from their co-religionists regarding their beliefs and 
religious behaviour. In most of Russia’s Muslim regions, Sufism is practised. Sufism is a form 
of Islam that incorporates traditional local, pre-Islamic and often superstitious elements. It is 
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also called ‘folk Islam’ or ‘peoples Islam’ and it is deeply rooted in the prevalent norms and 
customs and has adapted to the family- and clan-based societal system. Sufism is practiced in 
the North Caucasus but also in the Volga-Urals region. The special form of Islam, the Soviet 
experience and the accompanying separation from other Muslims had consequences in the sense 
of what ‘being a Muslim’ means to the local people. Being Muslim does not necessarily 
characterize the religious affiliation but the ethnic identification. Of course, the Russian 
Muslims practise Islam, with all its local adaptations, but more important, the religious label 
defines to which ethnicity one belongs. Hence, Islam is understood as an ethnical identification 
and therefore, Russian Muslims of the North Caucasus are called ‘ethnic Muslims’. That is, 
“Muslims by ethnicity, but not by belief and practice” (Sagramoso & Yemalianova, 2010, p. 
119).  
The Russian Muslims, however, are unequal either. Differences can be observed between the 
Muslims of the Volga-Urals region, of the North-West and of the North-East Caucasus. The 
differences can be ascribed to the divergent forms of Islamization, the influence of Russian 
culture and institutions and prevalent forms of societal organization. However, differences exist 
even between the Muslims of a certain region, for example regarding the adherence to different 
Islamic legal dogmatic schools (Hanifite, Shafi’ite, Maliki and Hanbali in Sunni Islam, which is 
followed in most parts of the North Caucasus).  
 
Islam came to the North-East Caucasus in the seventh century and reached the Volga-Urals in 
the seventh and eighth century. The North-West Caucasus, however, was only islamized in the 
17th and 18th century (Yemelianova, 2010a,b). 
Hence, since the 7th century, Islam was a formative and characterizing force of the North-East 
Caucasus. The resistance towards Russian expansionism, however, differed within the region. 
Chechnya, for example, always exhibited a strong anti-Russian opposition. In the 19th century, 
finally, the whole Caucasus belonged to the Russian empire, while certain parts had been 
occupied before. The Russian state did not interfere much with the prevalent social and 
institutional structures. Hence, the societal structure, based on clan and family ties, and the 
particular informal rules and laws, sometimes operating according to local sharia law, remained 
intact. Local norms and customs and a form of Islam that incorporated traditional, pre-Islamic 
and superstitious elements were the essential elements of social life. A hierarchic societal 
structure based on family or clan membership as well as on customary law replaced an official 
government bureaucracy (Yemelianova, 2010a,c). Sometimes it is argued that Russia’s rare 
interference in the internal affairs of the North Caucasus and the non-implementation of Russian 
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institutions is responsible for the region’s different development compared to the Volga-Urals. 
Both are mainly Muslim regions that have been Islamized between the seventh and eighth 
century. Hence, both regions have an Islamic tradition regarding the societal and institutional 
development. But today, the Volga-Urals is one of the economically most developed regions in 
Russia. However, in the Volga-Urals, Russian institutions were much more prevalent within the 
political, bureaucratic and societal environment for a long time. The Russian expansion of the 
late 16th century provoked a counter-reaction and reinforced local traditions and customs, 
including Islamic traditions and the region-specific ‘Tatar Islam’. But the Russian interference 
in daily life was stronger than in the North Caucasus. Therefore, the Muslims of the Volga-
Urals partly implemented Russian bureaucratic and political structures while in the North 
Caucasus, the interference was much less and hence, pre-Russian structures persisted 
(Yemelianova, 2010b). 
 
The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 hit the Russian Muslims hard. Mosques, madrasas, Islamic 
institutions, Islamic literature and its publication were forbidden and religious buildings and 
infrastructure destroyed. Muslims, and in general believers, were not allowed to practise most of 
the religious rituals. For example, it was forbidden to travel to Mecca to participate at the annual 
hajj. Islamic clerics and intellectuals were persecuted, arrested and deported; thousands of them 
left the country. Official Islamic education was not feasible in the Soviet Union since the 
teachers were forced out. Unofficial education was conducted in the underground by 
uneducated local mullahs and imams with mere religious knowledge. Therewith, the high 
intellectual and theological form of Islam got lost. Sufism and its mystical elements and 
ceremonies were forced to lead a secret existence. But since Islam incorporated a religious and 
an identifying component, it could not be completely erased.  
During the Soviet period, the suppression of certain parts of the population depended on the 
group’s or clan’s history and former connections. Those that were disadvantaged before were 
severely suppressed in the Soviet Union and those that had been loyal to the central government 
were treated superior but only as long as Moscow was further supported. The Soviet policy, 
however, strengthened the traditional clan structure in the North Caucasus. Moscow was seen as 
an alien entity and the attitude towards the central government differed between acceptance (for 
example in parts of the Volga-Urals and the North-West Caucasus) and complete rejection (in 
most regions of the North-East Caucasus and partly the North-West Caucasus). Clan solidarity 
increased and the prevalent societal structures and forms of social organization gained more 
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relevance. Therefore, the discrepancies between the central government and the regions of the 
North Caucasus widened.  
The alphabet was changed two times, first from Arabic to Latin (1920s) and then from Latin to 
Cyrillic (1930s), leaving the people cut-off from their literary tradition. Russian became the 
language of higher education (Sagramoso & Yemelianova, 2010).  
During the Second World War the Soviets’ relaxed their atheist policy to gather their own 
population’s support. Certain ethnic groups, however, were under suspicion to back the 
Germans or were accused for other crimes and were deported to Siberia or places in Central 
Asia. Many parts of the Caucasian population were affected. For example, in 1943 more than 
63,000 Karachay were deported and in 1944 500,000 Chechens and Ingush followed, as well as 
37,000 Balkars and many more (Coene, 2012, p. 137). The territories of the deported 
populations were split between other administrative units. This caused new tensions when many 
years later some of the deportees were allowed to return home (Coene, 2010). According to 
Yemelianova (2010b, p. 24), the deportations decreased the Chechen population by one third.  
In the 1950s, religious oppression increased again, while in the 1960s the regime started to 
loosen its strict policy. It was assumed that the Soviet policy had achieved its goal and that the 
population was not susceptible to religion anymore. The so-called ‘Soviet Islam’ was even 
invented and supported by the regime. Of course it was in accordance with Soviet principles. 
‘Soviet Islam’ generated official imams whose religious knowledge was very constrained and 
indoctrinated by the Soviet ideology. The relevant personnel was uncritical to Moscow. Soon 
after, they were suspected to be part of the corrupt bureaucratic structure penetrating the whole 
Union. However, the plan did not work out and religious feelings were not completely 
eliminated. The North Caucasus has always been a relatively poor region with the 
corresponding socio-economic problems. People were merely literate and in general badly 
educated, living standards and life expectancy were low, and access to health care was 
constrained. The patriarchal societal system, the tribal structures and the corresponding forms of 
societal organization had changed little for centuries.†† The liberalization of the regime’s 
religious policy, events like the Russo-Afghan war and the Soviet defeat in 1988, but also the 
bad socio-economic conditions led to an increasing interest in Islam since the late 1970s and 
1980s, especially among young people. 
The indigenous increase in interest in Islam met an equally rising interest from foreign Islamic 
organizations. With the foreign interest came Wahhabism or Salafism to the North Caucasus 
                                               
††
 In part socio-economic conditions improved in the Soviet Union. For example, illiteracy decreased significantly, diseases were 
eliminated and female emancipation was advanced. However, in the North Caucasus, as elsewhere, the improvements were 
straightforward and large parts of its population suffered under the Soviet regime. 
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and the Volga-Urals. In this context, Wahhabism and Salafism are often used as synonymous, 
which is incorrect, although there are many similarities. Salafism is a movement that regards the 
first three Muslim generations as the role model for all following Muslims. Accordingly, Islam 
should be practiced in the way Muhammad and his companions did. The three generations 
succeeding Muhammad still followed the exact way of Islam, this is how it is written and told. 
Accordingly, the fundamental sources for believers are the Quran and the Sunnah. Salafism 
rejects modern achievements as well as Western ideologies and concepts. An Islamic state, 
hence, a theocracy, incorporating a legal system according to Islamic law or the sharia, is the 
only possible form of a state. Today, at least in the Western literature, Salafism is related to 
violent jihad against non-believers and Muslims not adhering to the true form of Islam. 
Therefore, the term “Salafi-Jihadis” emerged. Salafi-Jihadis are adherents of Salafism waging a 
violent jihad against Muslims and non-Muslims, civilians, governmental structures and 
bureaucracies. 
Wahhabism is ascribed to the ideology of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792). It 
depicts a very conservative form of Islam, emphasising the unity of God and strict adherence to 
the original statements and to the Prophet’s way of life. Wahhabism rejects modernity and any 
interpretation of the Quran. Despite commonalities, Wahhabism can rather be described as a 
sub-form or part of Salafism. Salafis, however, generally refuse the term “Wahhabi”. 
Often, the literature on Islam in Russia uses both expressions synonymously. Wahhabism and 
Salafism then describe a very conservative form of Islam practised, for example, in Saudi 
Arabia, including the application of violence against Muslims who do not adhere to the “pure” 
form of Islam, and non-Muslims. However, even the Russian government is struggling with the 
right definition and uses the term “Wahhabism” very broadly and not always in the right 
context. 
The current article, however, uses the term Wahhabism to describe the radical and violent form 
of Islam penetrating the North Caucasus at least since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The 
author is aware of the fact that the usage of the terms – Wahhabism and Salafism – is 
disputable. The radical and violent movement that should be described within the current 
context, however, is usually denoted Wahhabism or Salafism in the relevant literature.‡‡ 
Wahhabsim, however, started to penetrate the North Caucasus in the 1980s. With Gorbachev’s 
policy of perestroika a new law was passed in October 1990 that legalized most religious 
activities and afforded freedom of conscience (Yemelianova, 2010b). At least the law on 
                                               
‡‡
 See, for example: Akaev (2010), Coene (2010), Halbach (2001), Khanbabaev (2010), Sagramoso & Yemelianova (2010), 
Yemelianova (2010b). 
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religious freedom and other steps of liberalisation introduced by the Gorbachev-regime cleared 
the way for a religious revival and for foreign religious influence. Islamic organisations from 
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Kuwait, the UAE, Syria, Afghanistan, Turkey, Malaysia, but also from 
the USA and Europe and other countries sent money and personal in large quantities. The 
foreign Islamic influence met an increasing indigenous interest in Islam. Domestic reasons for 
the Islamic revival were the ideological but also the structural vacuum that was left after the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, the bad and even deteriorating socio-economic indicators and the 
inability of the new Russian state to generate clear rules and structures, like the rule of law. 
Furthermore, the knowledge of Islam was rather constrained among the Muslim parts of the 
population in the North Caucasus and people could easily be influenced. 
Economically, the situation worsened after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The so-called 
valley of tears describes the deterioration in average per capita incomes on the territory of the 
Soviet Union in the 1990s. The North Caucasus, which was one of the poorest regions of the 
Soviet Union, suffered even more after the breakup. Mass-unemployment was caused by the 
shutdown of military-industrial enterprises and other Soviet industrial firms. Federal subsidies 
were suddenly cancelled. This resulted in the impoverishment of large parts of the population. 
Additionally, after 1991, Soviet Muslims were suddenly cut-off from their co-religionists and 
found themselves being inhabitants of newly independent states like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan, or as members of the federal subjects of 
the Russian Federation. The division of regional units during Soviet times already clashed with 
real ethnic borders and sensitivities. This can be seen by means of structural compositions like 
Kabardino-Balkaria (Halbach, 2001). Displacement and forced resettlement, however, were the 
order of the day since Russia first set a foot in the North Caucasus. During World War II, whole 
populations were deported. These actions did not improve the relationships between the many 
ethnicities of the North Caucasus and the resulting tensions continue today. The displacements 
and the redrawing of borders after the breakup of the Soviet Union, regardless of ethnic 
structures, led to recurring struggles between ethnicities and clans in the new states or federal 
subjects. Additionally, the Soviet hierarchy suddenly disintegrated. The social networks and the 
strong ethnic clan and family ties that had always been relevant in the North Caucasus became 
even more important. Hence, traditional forms of societal organisation were strengthened and 
gained more relevance instead of giving way to more modern forms of society. The ideological 
vacuum that was left after the Soviet Union had disappeared could easily be filled with Islamic 
contents, since the North Caucasian Muslims did not know much about Islam and practised 
their religion according to traditional and customary norms. Along with the dissolution of state 
 13 
structures, the economic decline and the impoverishment of the population came criminal 
activities like drug trafficking and arms sales. The new regional governments and bureaucracies 
were corrupt and often involved in illegal activities.  
 
It can be stated that, in the North Caucasus and the Volga-Urals, at least since the end of the 
Soviet Union, an Islamic revival is observable. This revival is accompanied by foreign financial, 
ideological and personal support. Without the particular donors, the Islamic flourishing would 
have been impossible in this way. Wahhabi ideology was propagated and met an increasing 
indigenous interest in Islam. The interest resulted from the bad socio-economic situation, the 
ideological and institutional vacuum left by the Soviet Union and the inability of the Russian 
state to implement the rule of law and an according institutional environment. Especially young, 
unemployed males without any future prospects saw a rational alternative in what the foreign 
Muslim tutors propagated. The Wahhabi jamaats (the Islamist communities) led the bad socio-
economic situation back to the deviation from the right path of pure Islam. They were the only 
ones that addressed the socio-economic problems and accused the official authorities of 
corruption and crime. Therefore, they seemed to offer an alternative to the current miserable 
state, at least for the disillusioned youth. Additionally, financial incentives played a role, since 
some new recruits achieved a monthly assistance of US$ 100-200, an impressive sum for those 
peoples (Akaev, 2010). The majority of the North Caucasian population, however, did not 
support the Wahhabis. They were used to their century-old traditions and forms of societal 
organisation, incorporating Sufism with all its mystical and superstitious elements. The mixture 
of Islam with local norms and customs and certain societal norms – for example the respect and 
adoration for the oldest members of a community – was a thorn in the flesh of the Salafis. 
Therefore, tensions, resulting in armed conflicts, emerged between Sufis and Salafis. Still, the 
struggles of the North Caucasus cannot solely be traced back on religious matters. Efforts to 
achieve independence from Russia and ethnic tensions that had nothing to do with religious or 
independence matters persisted and caused trouble. Religion, however, was exploited in many 
ways. 
 
4. Chechnya and other regions 
 
The Chechen struggle started as a separation movement. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, 
Chechnya was quasi-independent, but its status as an independent country was not 
acknowledged by most states, including, of course, Russia. Since Chechnya has been an Islamic 
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region for centuries the predominant form of Islam (Sufism and Islam as ethnic identity) plays a 
formative role. The radical Islamic component, however, that was decisive for the region’s 
subsequent history, was introduced from the outside. The Chechens were Sufis and had no 
contact to other forms of Islam. They wanted to maintain their long-established forms of 
societal organization, including family- and clan-hierarchies and the traditional, ritual form of 
Islam. Wahhabism and the accompanying jihadi-component were introduced by the foreign 
Islamic donors and missionaries. Without its external introduction, radical violent Islam would 
not play a decisive role in the region.  
The first Chechen War (1994-1996) started as a Chechen separation movement, but its 
outcome, the Russian defeat and quasi-independence of Chechnya, was partly the result of 
external Islamic interference. Financial and operational assistance, the implementation of 
training camps, the ideological and military education and the influx of Afghani veterans and 
other foreign jihadists drove the events. 
After the first Chechen War, however, Islam was utilized by the many different fractions. 
Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov, who generally opposed the Wahhabis, used Islamic 
rhetoric and partly adjusted to the Islamist opposition in order to consolidate power and 
legitimacy. The Wahhabis accused the prevalent politicians and bureaucrats of corruption and 
offered pure Islam as an alternative, which could only be achieved with the implementation of 
an Islamic state and therewith sharia law. The societal structure in Chechnya, however, was far 
more fragmented. Warlords, clan-elders, Salafi-Jihadis, traditional Muslim clerics and so on 
opposed each other, the official government or/and the Wahhabis. Certain persons like, for 
example, Shamil Basaev, Salman Raduyev, Arbi Barayev or the former Afghani veteran Ibn al-
Khattab were able to unite some clans or villages behind them. Hence, local rulers were in 
control of particular regions, but they could not achieve a nation-wide backing. Additionally, 
tensions existed between clans and tribes that had nothing to do with religious matters or 
separation efforts. Official authority is traditionally not respected in the region and the clans and 
tribes continued to obey to their own hierarchies and customary law. The confusing structures 
resulted in the weakness of a corrupt Chechen government that was unable to enforce a military 
monopoly and to provide a basic level of social security and services. The intellectual elite had 
long left the chaotic region and hence, the remaining bureaucrats, politicians and personnel in 
public office lacked the relevant knowledge and experience. 
Aslan Maskhadov, however, could not or did not want to inhibit the introduction of sharia 
courts in 1996. This step, however, was unpopular among most parts of the population. 
Traditional Muslim clerics opposed the spread of Wahhabism. The Wahhabis themselves 
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condemned Sufism and pleaded the implementation of pure Islam as it was practiced by the 
Prophet Muhammad himself and the three following generations. Because of the growing 
external support and their assistance in defeating the Russians in the first Chechen War, the 
Wahhabis’ influence and power even within the Chechen government grew. Thereby, tensions 
between supporters of traditional Islam, Sufis, and Wahhabis increased and ended up in armed 
conflicts. Besides the separatist and religious conflicts, Chechnya was facing an increase of 
illegal activities like drug trafficking, arms sales, hostage-taking and extortion. The socio-
economic situation further deteriorated and the region sank into chaos. 
It can be assumed that President Maskhadov was uninformed of or at least unable to prevent the 
military invasion of joint Chechen and Dagestani Wahhabi forces on Dagestani territory in 
August 1999 (Akaev, 2010). It is usually reported that the Wahhabis’ goal under the control of 
Shamil Basayev and Ibn al-Khattab was to create a North Caucasian Imamate. However, there 
exist other versions of the incident, including that the original goal of crossing the border to 
Dagestan were peace negotiations as well as stories introducing Russian oligarchs, intelligence 
services and the Kremlin (Akaev, 2010, pp. 74-75). At least it seems obvious that the military 
intervention served the interests of quite a few people, for example Vladimir Putin’s. While the 
first Chechen War was indicated a separation war, the Russian intervention in 1999 was 
declared to be an antiterrorist operation and it was directly related to the radical Islamic 
movement in Chechnya. For several reasons, the Russian government decided to run the 
military campaign which became known as the second Chechen war. Russia had to prevent the 
expansion of Islamic radicalism in the North Caucasus but also in other parts of the Federation. 
The violent extremists did not constrain their operations on the Caucasian territory but 
expanded them on other Russian federal subjects and cities, for example Moscow. Furthermore, 
after the defeats in the Russo-Afghan war and in the first Chechen war, the Russian army 
wanted to demonstrate its force and its will to fight extremism. Besides, the war supported 
Vladimir Putin’s presidential campaign, representing him as a strong and assertive president and 
leader. And of course, the Russian government could not afford to loose control over the 
resource-rich territories surrounding the Caspian Sea.  
However, the realization of the so-declared anti-terrorist campaign was highly questionable. 
The harsh Russian military actions resulted in thousands of dead civilians, hundreds of 
thousands displaced persons and the destruction of homes, villages and infrastructure. For the 
Chechens, it felt not like a military campaign against the extremists, but like a war against the 
Chechen population.  
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Regarding its goal to stem Islamic radicalism, the Russian intervention was only partly 
successful. The war left Chechnya devastated and withdrew the population’s last economic 
basis. Lack of prospects, unemployment, low and decreasing living standards and, of course, 
hate against the interventionists drove especially parts of the young population into the arms of 
the Islamic radicals. Therefore, radical ideas and ideologies further circulated. Still, the attempt 
to stem the Wahhabi influence was partly successful. An important step was to constrain foreign 
Islamic funding which indeed decreased significantly during the 2000s. Furthermore, the 
Chechen society was still not convinced by the Wahhabi principles and preferred the traditional 
form of Sufi Islam, being accompanied by the century-old forms of societal life and 
organisation. Additionally, the Wahhabi forces themselves had partly fallen out and were 
involved in internal conflicts. But still all these facts did not completely eradicate the radical 
Wahhabi ideology, especially not since the bad socio-economic conditions continued. 
Therefore, the Russian government implemented a pro-Moscow government in Chechnya and 
therewith invented targeted killings of Islamists and the policy of zachistki (Nichols, 2010). 
Zachistki describes a military or police operation, where the forces target a certain person or 
group of suspicious people. Usually, the target’s house or village is surrounded by the invaders 
and then the relevant objects are eliminated. This method, however, is accompanied by a lot of 
civilian victims and causes far-reaching destruction, since often houses of innocents and 
infrastructure are destroyed. Furthermore, the Russian government utilizes the societal 
structures and traditions of the Chechens since not only the offenders themselves are affected 
but also their families. Hence, if a person is under suspicion of being a terrorist, the family or 
relatives are punished. That is, houses of family-members are burned and the persons 
themselves are beaten, carried off or even killed. This rude practice was not accompanied by 
far-reaching support from the Chechen population. On the contrary, the consequences are often 
counterproductive and drive especially young people into the arms of extremists. Furthermore, 
the Russian government does not differentiate between people who are willing to fight a violent 
jihad against the Russian state and non-believers and usual Muslims. Often peaceful believers 
are affected by the policies, since religious practices can suffice to be considered suspect. 
Sometimes marginal deviations from the local traditional lifestyle or “exuberant” religious 
behaviour make a person suspicious. For example, praying five times a day or unusual 
attendance at the mosque can result in violent actions against the suspicious individual or its 
relatives.  
Moscow realized that the approaches are somewhat counterproductive and do not solve the 
region’s socio-economic problems. Therefore, in 2010, President Medvedev presented an 
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official strategy for the socio-economic development of the North Caucasus until 2025 (Nichol, 
2010). Earlier on Russia started to support the pro-Moscow Chechen government financially. 
The reconstruction of Grosny, which was almost completely destroyed, can be traced back to 
the Russian assistance. Further Russian financial aid is observable at different occasions. In 
2014, for example, the Olympic Winter Games will take place in Sochi at the Caucasian Black 
Sea coast and imply massive investment, especially in infrastructure, in the region.   
However, financial aid alone will not solve the structural and political mistakes that were made. 
The Russian anti-terrorist operations indeed led to a decrease of terrorist attacks in Chechnya. 
However, since the mid-2000s, terrorist activities significantly increased in Dagestan and 
Ingushetia, what indicates a mere shift of the actions. Besides, further attacks on Russian 
territory, apart from the North Caucasus, were conducted (Nichol, 2010).  
 
In Ingushetia, the responsible authorities took early steps to inhibit the diffusion of Wahhabi 
ideology. An important factor was the close cooperation between the Sufi leaders and the 
Ingush government authorities in the 1990s. Already in 1998 the Ingush Parliament passed a 
law that banned Wahhabi activities from the territory of Ingushetia (Akaev, 2010). Since 2007, 
however, there have been significantly more terrorist attacks, killings and hijackings. In 2009, 
Ingushetia experienced 436 violent incidents compared to 452 in Chechnya (Nichol, 2010, 
referring to data from the Open Source Center). Ingushetia, however, is not only the setting for 
Wahhabi-Sufi conflicts, but also for ethnic tensions. During the Soviet period, large parts of 
today’s Chechnya and Ingushetia were joined together as Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic. In 1992, the territory was split into the Republic of Ingushetia and the 
Chechen Republic. There still exist conflicts concerning border demarcations. Furthermore, 
Ingush-Ossetian tensions persist. The appointment of Yunus-Bek Yevkuruv as Ingush president 
in 2008 gives reason to hope that the situation can be stabilized. Terrorist attacks and police 
operations decreased since 2010 and the region calmed down a bit. 
 
Wahhabism began to spread in Dagestan since the 1980s and after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union the region exhibited a strong religious revival. Most Dagestanis were traditionalists and 
opposed Wahhabi teachings and ideology. However, especially the younger generation that 
suffered from economic repression and lack of prospects was open to radical ideas. The 
Wahhabi movement also benefitted from strong foreign financial aid and missionaries sent to 
Dagestan. According to Khanbabaev, in the early 1990s, Dagestan was covered by foreign 
Islamic Organizations providing “financial and methodological assistance to various local 
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Islamic groups of a fundamentalist nature” (Khanbabaev, 2010, p. 102). Beginning in 1999 
official authorities curtailed the influence of foreign Islamic donors significantly. After the 
drastic steps by the Russian government in Chechnya, it can be assumed that some of the local 
extremists passed the border to Dagestan. Terrorist attacks, police and military operations and 
other violent incidents are still the order of the day in Dagestan. Beside Islamist extremism, 
organized crime and corruption continue to spread in the Republic, placing Dagestan at the top 
regarding violent incidents in the North Caucasus (Nichol, 2010). 
 
The North-West Caucasus (NWC) exhibited a different development regarding Islamization. 
The mass Islamization of the region took place in the 17th and 18th centuries by Crimean and 
Ottoman missionaries (Sagramoso & Yemelianova, 2010). Most of the Muslims of the NWC 
adhere to Sunni Islam of the Hanafi madhhab; compared to the Shafi’i madhhab in the North-
East Caucasus (NEC). Sufism is hardly prevalent in the region. However, local customary 
norms and traditions kept on playing a major role regarding coexistence and societal life, while 
Islam and its rules were considered less important. Since the 15th century, the region was 
exposed to different and conflicting invaders like the Ottomans, Iranians, Crimeans and the 
Russians. In the second half of the 18th century Russia could enforce its rule over the whole 
Caucasus. In 1921 the Soviet Mountain Republic was established. It incorporated today’s 
Chechnya, Ingushetia, Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia while Dagestan 
depicted an independent Soviet Republic. In 1924 the Soviet Mountain Republic was dissolved 
and six autonomous regions were established instead: Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-
Balkaria, Adygea, Chechnya, Ingushetia and North Ossetia. Hence, peoples of different 
ethnicities and languages were arbitrarily combined in previously non-existent entities, like the 
Kabardinians and the Balkars or the Cherkess and the Karachais (Sagramoso & Yemelianova, 
2010, p. 117). In the Soviet period the administrative unites were modified several times. 
During World War II the Balkars and Karachais were deported to places in Central Asia. In the 
1950s they were allowed to return home and found their original places settled by other folks. 
Again, the territories were adjusted. Additionally, some parts of the population were treated 
preferentially by the Soviets, for example the Kabardinians and the Cherkess in certain 
territories, while others were repressed. The resulting ethnic tensions, however, remain today. 
The North-West Caucasians were ethnic but not practicing Muslims, even more so than the 
North-East Caucasians. Furthermore, the immigration of Russians and other Slavic people 
increased the share of Orthodox Christians within the population (Sagramoso & Yemelianova, 
2010, pp. 117-118).  
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The Islamic revival and the emergence of radical Islam behaved slightly different compared to 
the NEC. This is due to several specific factors on hand in the NWC. Due to the multi-ethnic 
character and the lower quantity of Muslim population, the Islamic revival in Karachay-
Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Adygea after the breakup of the Soviet Union was not as 
strong as in the NEC. Furthermore, the North-West Caucasian Muslims were not as religious. 
Due to the late Islamization of the NWC the region had always been inhabited by other 
religiosities, too, especially Orthodox Christians who represent the majority in parts of the 
NWC. Hence, Islam was not as deeply rooted in the region’s cultural and societal history. 
Furthermore, the different periods of Islamization led to the adoption of different legal Islamic 
schools. The NWC adopted the Hanafi school, which seems to be more flexible than the Shafi’i 
school of the NEC. In the NWC, ethno-nationalism played a major role and forces opposing the 
Russian central government or regional authorities were usually rooted in ethnic-nationalism 
movements. Hence, Islamic parties and organizations did not depict the major political 
opposition.  
However, the low level of knowledge on Islam and the economic misery that was partly 
attributed to the corrupt bureaucracies and authorities facilitated the diffusion of radical 
Wahhabi ideas. Furthermore, the wars in Chechnya had a radicalising effect especially on the 
young and better educated Muslims in the region. However, the regional governments of NWC 
fought massively against the diffusion of radical violent ideas. At any rate, radical Islamic 
groups existed in the underground and most of them were connected with Chechen rebel 
groups. Terrorists from the North-West Caucasian republics were being accused of participating 
in terrorist attacks in Russia. But still the radical Islamic threat is less present in the NWC than 
in the NEC (Sagramoso & Yemelianova, 2010). 
 
5. Is Islam responsible?  
 
Islam in the North Caucasus takes on very different forms. To discuss the religious influence, it 
must be differentiated between Islam as it is practiced for centuries and between radical 
Wahhabi or Salafi tendencies that spread in the region since the breakup of the Soviet Union. 
The North Caucasian form of Sufi-Islam is not responsible for the economic stagnation. The 
more relevant factor is the form of societal organization. Caucasian societies are still shaped by 
patriarchal structures and by clan and tribal ties that have barely been modified for centuries. 
The clans or tribal communities act self-responsible regarding social order and government. The 
oldest members are the most respected and important decisions are usually taken by them. The 
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clan’s moral and customs are irrevocable and the community is highly honoured by every 
member. If an individual misbehaves the clan’s honour is spoiled, and an assault against one of 
its members is seen as an affront against all. A clan has a high prestige when its members are 
courageous and behave strictly to their ethical rules. Examples are the so-called teips (tribal 
communities) of the Chechens and the Ingush (Coene, 2010). Loyalty and helpfulness but also 
strong tensions can persist between the clans. In socio-economic terms, the form of societal 
organization can be described as “limited morality” (Dobler, 2011; Platteau, 2000). The term 
depicts a traditional form of societal organisation where the membership to a certain clan, tribe 
or family is considered most important and determines a person’s fate. The societal groups are 
structured hierarchically and individualism is rated less important. The value system emphasises 
“independence, physical strength, courage, self-sufficiency, and high individual ideas of honour 
[and demands] […] strict loyalty to family and clan” (Zürcher, 2007, p. 13). The clan depicts 
the societal basis, incorporating an informal rule structure. Loyalty to the clan, honour and 
responsibility are fundamental. The family or clan oldest are especially honoured and respected. 
The patriarch has the final say and can override rules and conventions. Often, governmental 
structures are considered less important or are ignored in favour of local informal rules of 
conduct. Trust in official authorities, but also in members of other groups (clans, tribes, 
families) is usually low. Therefore, cooperation with other groups rarely occurs. From an 
economic point of view, low levels of trust and cooperation induce low levels of economic 
growth, since business takes place only within the particular group but not with members of 
other groups. Hence, the quantity of possible business partners and of businesses themselves is 
constrained. Furthermore, traditional forms of societal organisation are usually accompanied by 
other growth hampering factors. In traditional societies, for example, women often do not 
participate in the labour market. The birth rate is high and young adults marry within the village 
or region of their birth, care for their parents or older family members and take over the 
agricultural work. Educational levels are usually low. People are agricultural self-supporters and 
do not participate in a modern professional life. Therefore, social mobility is rare. Hence, 
regarding the North Caucasus, it can be assessed that the traditionally practiced form of Islam is 
not hindering to socio-economic development per se. It is the form of societal organization that 
does not correspond to a modern, individual, highly educated and economically efficient society 
(generalised morality) instead. As good as the form of self-organisation and self-governance has 
worked for many centuries – it definitely helped the tribes and clans of the Caucasus to survive 
and to persist against other powerful forces – it cannot be combined with a modern-style 
economic and political order. 
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Furthermore, the multi-ethnical environment involves the risk of permanent instability, as is the 
case in many parts of the Caucasus. Instability of any kind inhibits economic development, 
since capital will merely be invested in a region with a high risk of default. In the North 
Caucasus, conflicts not only exist between Caucasian separatists and Russians. The tensions, for 
example, involve Ingush and Ossetians, Cherkess and Karachay, Akkin-Chechens and Laks, 
Balkars, Kabardins, Dargins, Avars, Kumyks and many more (Coene, 2010; Zürcher, 2007). 
Many of these conflicts can be traced back on the political and federal structures created by the 
Soviets and Russians, that ignored the complicated Caucasian ethnogram. Administrative units 
were generated regardless of the ethnic composition. Some communities were split, others were 
granted autonomy, several were disadvantaged and even deported. Forced resettlements and 
deportations of whole populations worsened the relationships between many groups. When 
some ethnic groups were allowed to return to their homelands, they found it settled by others or 
split by new borders. Problems flared up after the breakup of the Soviet Union, when suddenly 
independent states and new federal subjects emerged. The ethnic tensions in the North Caucasus 
continue today. Also religion is often indicated as a reason for ethnic tensions, this is not true. 
Most of the conflicts in the Caucasus (not only in the North) have other origins and religion is 
exploited if it plays a role at all. 
Therefore, the religious component should not be overestimated, since it is by far not the only 
source of instability and conflict. However, radical Islam and therewith violent jihad, 
incorporating terrorist attacks and violent incidents in the North Caucasus, had a significant 
influence on the region’s history of the last twenty years. The Islamic revival, however, was 
strongly supported by foreign donors and missionaries. Externally introduced Wahhabi ideology 
spread in all North Caucasian republics. Terror attacks and violent incidents became the order 
of the day in the region, also Chechnya, Dagestan and lately Ingushetia were hit particularly 
hard. The governmental campaign against Wahhabism indeed constrained the foreign financial 
Islamist support. However, the local Islamist groups developed self-financing strategies that 
included criminal activities, especially hijacking, ransom demand and extortion. This and the 
general unmanageable and instable situation attracted international crime like drug trafficking 
and illegal arms sales. Hence, parts of the region became almost ungovernable and sank into 
chaos, for example Chechnya until the mid-2000s, afterwards Ingushetia and currently 
Dagestan. Thus, although foreign-introduced radical Islamist ideologies could not gain foothold 
in the population, they were able to cause instability and to attract further criminal activities. 
There would have been conflicts in the North Caucasus without the introduction of Wahhabism 
and violent jihadist ideas. But the diffusion of radical Islam triggered several important 
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incidents that further harmed the region. Separation efforts were mingled up with jihadist 
ideology; Islam was exploited and used as an instrument to achieve political goals. In return, 
radical Islam justified the harsh Russian intervention in Chechnya and the taking of drastic 
measures in other regions. Hence, violent Islamic ideology is not the only source of conflict in 
the region. But its strong presence since the collapse of the Soviet Union influenced the 
Caucasus’ recent history. However, its impact rather seems to affect political strategies and 
nationwide policies than the North Caucasian society. The North Caucasians are impacted 
through harsh interventions by the Russians or the particular regional government. Furthermore, 
they suffer from the continuing economic decline. But the ideological influence of jihadist ideas 
seems to be restricted to young, unemployed men without prospects, to whom the violent 
Islamic agenda appears as sole alternative.  
The instability generated by radical ideologies and violent jihad has severe impacts on the 
region. A chaotic and unmanageable place, as depicted by the North Caucasus, at least partly 
over the last twenty years, attracts all forms of international crime, illegal activity and violence. 
Therefore, economic development is almost impossible. The implementation of an industrial 
structure that would be able to generate jobs and income necessitates secure and manageable 
production possibilities, calculable costs, infrastructure and educated and skilled labour. 
Furthermore a banking sector and a financial market structure are necessary to channel the 
capital. All these prerequisites cannot be provided in a political unstable, war torn and 
physically insecure environment.  
At any rate, the North Caucasus’ situation is not only determined by ethnic heterogeneity and 
Islamic influence. Instead, a mixture of interrelated factors is responsible. It ends up in a 
widespread and deeply rooted network of corruption and nepotism. Bureaucracies and 
authorities on all regional and governmental levels, including the local police, majors of 
villages, peoples in offices, local politicians and jurists, business people, criminals, the military 
and central governmental bureaucrats and politicians are deeply involved in a network of 
corruption and crime. The economic exploitation of the region, especially regarding its natural 
resources, lies in the hands of influential clan or family leaders who are part of the corrupt 
system. The economic gains are divided between the clan leaders and corrupt bureaucrats and 
politicians. Often, illegal activities are involved in one way or the other. That is to say, many 
interest groups are not interested in stabilizing the region. They want to keep on running the 
shadow and criminal economies in the Caucasus and they are supported by the many unsettled 
conflicts (Coene, 2010).  
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The enduring inability of the Russian state to generate clear and effective rules regulating the 
political, legal and economic spheres depicts another major factor responsible for the bad 
economic and generally chaotic situation in the North Caucasus. The breakup of the Soviet 
Union left an institutional vacuum and until now the Russian state was unable to fill it. A rule of 
law that clearly determines the government’s and the citizen’s rights and obligations is essential 
for the functioning of every state. Furthermore, the rule of law incorporates an independent third 
party, the judiciary, enforcing the law, so that both sides, citizens and state, can rely on it. The 
Russian patriarchal system works contrary to the idea of the rule of law. This is the case since in 
Russian history, there has always been a patriarch able to override and ignore the rules if it was 
in his interest. The patriarchal system in Russia can historically be observed on all levels, from 
the family to the clan to landowners, bureaucrats and at least the head of the state. Of course 
such a system is penetrated by corruption, since the rules that are finally applied depend on the 
preferences of the patriarch. Furthermore, it is known that the rules are not really effective. 
Hence, they can be applied or not, depending on the goodwill of the leader. Therefore, if 
somebody wants a rule not to be applied, he or she can try to influence the preferences of the 
patriarch. Alternatively, since the rules cannot be relied on, individuals can just ignore them and 
live with the risk of subjective punishment which is always present, independent of the rules. 
The people of the North Caucasus have learned to live with this situation for centuries or even 
longer. They were exposed to different external influences and organized their societal life 
themselves. A combination of clan-based ethical rules, customary law, local codes of conduct, 
norms and traditions replaced a central governmental set of institutions. Therefore, the Soviet’s 
or the Russian state’s laws never really reached the mountain regions of the Caucasus. This 
makes it yet more difficult for Russia to implement clear and enforceable, rule-of-law-kind 
formal rules and structures in the region. However, Moscow not even tries to do so. Weak 
governance on the central-governmental as well as on the federal levels inhibits a socio-
economic development that would finally improve the living conditions and the environment 
for investments and businesses.  
The rule of law would determine clear responsibility, for example between the central and the 
regional governments. It would set a legal framework defining the rules of political, economic 
and societal life. Since the rules would be enforced by an independent third party, all parties 
concerned would have to adhere to them, the president of the state as well as the policeman or 
the civilian. This fact would create secure and stable conditions that allow an investor to 
calculate his wins and losses accurately. In the best case, the rule set should, besides providing 
stability, attract investors with free market institutions. Political and economic stability and an 
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attractive investment environment generate jobs and incomes. A corresponding legal system 
also imposes rules on the central and regional governments and prohibits and punishes 
corruption and crime. To implement such a system in a state penetrated by corruption and 
illegal activity is a difficult task. Since all levels of bureaucracy and authority participate in the 
corrupt system, there is no will to enforce the rule of law since then the government and the 
powerful parties would have to restrict themselves.  
Instead, the Russian government tries to stabilize the North Caucasus in other ways. One 
strategy is the tough course of action against Islamic radicals. The pros and cons of this 
approach have already been discussed. Also violent incidents decreased in Chechnya (where 
they are still on a high level), whereas they increased in Ingushetiia and Dagestan. In general, it 
can be supposed that the violent and unjustified course constantly breeds new violent separatists 
and Islamic jihadists. The other strategy is to implement pro-Moscow governments in the North 
Caucasian republics and to provide financial support to rebuild the economies. However, the 
fact that the Russian state is one of the only investors in the region, and that the few private 
investors are in one way or the other connected to the state demonstrates that independent 
private investors are not interested.  
The Russian approach, however, might incorporate some improvements, as the reconstruction 
of Grosny shows, but it does not result in sustainable economic development. Enhancements in 
the population’s living standards might not solve ethnic tensions, separation efforts, Soviet 
legacies and issues arising from struggles between tradition and modernity. But higher living 
standards might shift preferences away from traditional areas of tension. Poverty instead results 
in frustration and sensitivity for radical ideas. An increase in incomes and therewith living 
standards moves incentives and preferences. Usually economic development and rising per 
capita incomes are accompanied by higher educational standards that allow a more 
differentiating view. Hence, economic development might stabilize the region. But since there 
are so many destabilizing forces and factors at work in the North Caucasus, the theory of 
economic development and its positive impact on social and political stability remains 
controversial. Anyway, economic growth necessitates a certain level of stability, resulting from 
an adequate institutional environment. This is currently out of sight. 
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